Re: Evoluzione della crisi ucraina
tutto vero? insommaOriginariamente Scritto da Heinrich
che sia condivisibile dipende dai punti di vista, ma tutto vero proprio no.
che l'Europa ne sia serva possiamo anche dire di sì, sai è stata liberata (e poi foraggiata) in gran parte dagli USA... l'URSS s'era tenuta la metà orientale, rendendola più povera di quanto non lo fosse già, con dittature a destra e a manca e svariate stragi razziali. volente o nolente l'altra parte d'Europa è diventata spiccatamente democratica.
se poi crolla l'URSS gli USA non è che hanno tutte ste colpe...
tutt'ora la Russia appoggia governi esteri dove le stragi sono all'ordine del giorno, basta vedere qualsiasi votazione ONU e si capisce bene.
la Cina non ha basi in tutto il mondo perché non l'ha mai voluto, intanto s'è conquistata mezza Africa abbondante: toh, ti faccio una strada e una ferrovia ma tutti i beni che ricavo dal tuo suolo sono miei. ergo, ti impoverisco ancora di più. però lì va bene, perché non lo fanno gli USA, allora è tutto corretto, legittimo.
ancora con sta argomentazione ridicola de: la guerra in Ucraina è colpa degli USA.
lo volete capire che gli stati vicini alla Russia, reduci dall'URSS e consapevoli della dittatura folle di Putin, scelgono SPONTANEAMENTE di fare richiesta per entrare nella NATO o no?
lo volete capire o no che il mondo vuole la democrazia e che se deve "vendersi" a qualcuno lo fa al meno folle? che magari ti offre anche delle garanzie importanti.
Si vis pacem, para bellum.
Re: Evoluzione della crisi ucraina
A proposito di multipolarità e tutto il resto di seguito un estratto scritto da me, in inglese perchè parte di uno scambio con un giornalista finanziario americano con cui ho contatti
Lo metto se può interessare:
To have a multipolar system, the main rules and dynamics must be determined mostly by three or more states that are roughly equal in power at the top. The United States and China are clearly the two strongest countries, but there must be at least one more country that is close to their level for multipolarity to exist. This is where the idea of multipolarity breaks down. None of the countries that could potentially rank third (France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the like, anyway the Europe acting as a whole is congenitally tied to USA) is anywhere near a rough match for the United States or China. That holds true regardless of which criterion one uses. Polarity could be evaluated using military spending and GDP. But even by those basic measures, the system is not multipolar, and it is very unlikely that it will be for many decades. A simple calculation shows this clearly: unless either the United States or China collapses completely, the distance between those countries and any of the other contenders will not narrow anytime soon. All but India are too small in population to ever be in the same league, while India is too poor; it will not possibly reach this status until much later in this century, if ever.Before 1945, multipolarity was the usual state. International politics involved constantly changing alliances among roughly equal great powers.The balance of power could shift quickly, since joining or leaving a great power in an alliance had more impact than what any single state could achieve internally to boost its own power in the short run.In eras with many poles, the fairly equal distribution of power meant that states were often surpassing one another in strength, leading to long periods of change in which many subjects claimed to be the best, and it wasn’t clear which deserved the title. For instance, right before World War I, the United Kingdom could say it was the best based on its global navy and huge colonial territories, but its economy and army were smaller than those of Germany, which itself had a smaller army than Russia, and all three countries’ economies were outshined by that of the United States. The easily imitable nature of technology, meanwhile, made it possible for one great power to quickly close the gap with a superior rival by copying its advantages. Thus, in the early twentieth century, when Germany’s leaders wanted to lower the United Kingdom’s status, they had little trouble quickly building a fleet that was technologically competitive with the Royal Navy, and only after a few years from a crushing defeat they rapidly rose from a weak and restricted power to almost dominating Eurasia. A fictionalization of this dynamic is shown by the prequel of the movie “Kingsmen” set before and during the first world war.The result was a precarious balance on the constant brink of a catastrophic war, compared to which the conflict in Ukraine shows all its relative insignificance: Thirty Years’ War, Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World War II, Hundred Years’ War, French Wars of Religion, Eighty Years’ War, Franco-Prussian War, Crimean War, War of the Spanish Succession, in order of death toll.So the claim that the establishment of a multipolar world order could lead to a decrease in conflicts and the nuclear danger itself is a blatant mockery. Not surprisingly, the doomsday clock was the farthest from the apocalypse in 1991 when the world was undoubtedly perceived as unipolar.
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The challenges of the BRICS cooperation, which was intended to balance the West and support the Global South, reflect the complex reality. BRICS ended to be a facade and a tool for China’s ambitions and interests. This is in contrast with the admirable goals of the New Development Bank (NDB) treaty and The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) treaty, signed in 2014, which aimed to provide mutual financial assistance and liquidity protection to the BRICS members in case of financial difficulties or short-term liquidity pressures.Recent events reveal the truth clearly. April 26, Argentina’s Economy Minister Sergio Massa said his country would use the yuan to pay for imports from China. This could seem like another sign of how the world is abandoning the dollar because of the American bullying, and echoes Brazil’s president Lula’s call for a new “international medium of exchange” during his first state visit to China in April. He said: “Every night I ask myself why all countries have to base their trade on the dollar. Why can’t we do trade based on our own currencies? Who was it that decided that the dollar was the currency after the disappearance of the gold standard?” He also proposed that the Brics countries create their own alternative currency for trade and suggested that gold could be a standard for their currencies.Argentina has been stuck in a severe currency crisis for a long time, with inflation soaring to 100%, making it hard to restructure its debt with the International Monetary Fund, and on top of that, the worst drought ever has ruined the country’s farm exports. Bad economic policies drain the country of foreign exchange reserves, which are essential to buy imports.And this is where the Chinese approach comes into play:It opens swap lines, which give liquidity to countries that are in need and lack dollars in their reserves. This is indeed the tweet by Sergio Massa (as translated from spanish): “We activated the swap with China together with the ambassador Zou Xiaoli, businessmen and chambers of the sector, which allows us to pay in yuan the imports with that country and replace 1.040 billion dollars in April and 790 million from May.”The swap line is a contract where two parties agree to swap periodic payments in two different currencies, related to the capital and interest payments, based on specific contract terms. In this case, China transfers its yuan to Argentina, which boosts the South American country’s reserve stock. After that, the yuan is used to settle imports and exports between the two countries. In practice, it is a supply credit.Argentina’s formal part of the swap is unclear. A swap is an OTC contract that depends on the parties, so it could result in tighter economic ties (i.e. a Chinese stranglehold) in the absence of available liquidity.Beijing has funded many emerging countries within the Belt & Road framework with the same strategy, but now they are in trouble. The rise in interest rates on the dollar makes them try to restructure their foreign debt with multilateral institutions and international private lenders. China and the International Monetary Fund are in a power struggle, because China does not want to cut its loans’ nominal value and only offers payment extensions. China also wants Western multilateral lenders to reduce their exposures, which have always been “super senior”, to join in debt restructuring. If the IMF agrees to reduce its loans, it would soon vanish, and China would be the only global provider of emergency finance and a regular creditor.What becomes clear is that China does not want its currency to replace the dollar as the reference reserve currency. China simply wants to become the only country that can offer financial assistance to other countries in need, such as loans, swaps, or grants, lending money on a regular basis, and expecting to be repaid with interest, pledging the debtor’s assets.Lula’s statements show a total ignorance of the economic and financial mechanisms which actually rule the world and releasing them in front of the Chinese forum is a sign of a fatal naivety, ...or maybe something else, that continues to characterize the management of international relations of developing countries.What is the reason for most countries choosing to keep most of their reserves in US currency?A country needs to meet some criteria to play the current role of America: it needs to have huge and liquid financial markets that can absorb massive investments, in particular a capacious bond market; it needs to have a reputation for safety and legal stability, so that other countries are ready to invest billions in its government securities; and it needs to be willing to have endless current account deficits, since that is the opposite of a financial account surplus.US dollar's hegemonic status does not give the US government much economic benefit, but rather imposes a huge economic cost. This cost is determined by arithmetic of balance of payments.The balance of payments is the record of all transactions between a country and the rest of the world. It consists of three main accounts: the current account, the capital account, and the financial account. The current account is the difference between a country’s exports and imports of goods and services, plus net income and transfers from abroad. The capital account records the trade in non-financial assets and liabilities, such as land or patents. The financial account records the trade in financial assets and liabilities, such as stocks or bonds. The savings-investment gap is the difference between a country’s national savings and national investment. National savings is equal to domestic savings plus net income and transfers from abroad.If foreign inflows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment, or loans in the form of bond purchases, increase, by definition so must the excess of investment over savings. This is because the balance of payments must balance, meaning that any change in one component must be offset by an equal change in another component. In a nutshell: If foreign capital inflows do not increase exports or reduce imports, they must cause a current account deficit, which means that the country spends more than it earns from abroad. This deficit must be financed by borrowing from abroad, which increases the debt burden. Alternatively, if foreign capital inflows cause a currency appreciation and a loss of competitiveness, they must reduce exports or increase imports, which lowers the demand for domestic goods and services and increases unemployment.Increased inflows to the US do not cause investment to rise, because there are no productive investments in the US that investors want to make but cannot because of the unavailability of capital. In fact, the United states of America have already a high level of technology and savings that allows it to finance its own investment needs.Therefore if investments don’t rise, and for the balance of payment costraint, the inflows must cause savings to fall. This is because the excess of investment over savings must be equal to the excess of imports over exports, which is the current account deficit. There are two ways foreign capital inflows can cause savings to fall: either because of the wealth effect or because of the raising exchange rate.The wealth effect is when an increase in asset prices makes people feel wealthier and spend more. For example, if foreign capital inflows cause a stock market boom, US households may increase their consumption and reduce their savings. The increase in consumption means an increase in imports, which widens the current account deficit.The second case is when an appreciation of the currency makes exports more expensive and imports cheaper. For example, if foreign capital inflows cause a rise in the value of the US dollar, US exports may decline and imports may rise. This also widens the current account deficit. Then is not completely true that low US savings rates prove that the US relies on foreign savings to fund its investment or consumption. Rather, it is true that foreign accumulations of dollars force Americans to consume beyond their means .So foreign financial/capital inflows must cause domestic savings to fall, and the only way this can happen is with a rise in the debt burden or a rise in unemployment since capital inflows must be matched by an equal change in the current account balance.In light of this, when foreign central banks stockpile US dollar reserves, they increase the demand for US dollars and raise its exchange rate. This makes US exports more expensive and imports cheaper, leading to a trade deficit and a loss of domestic production and jobs; no other country is willing to absorb this cost and no one wants to have their currency become the dominant reserve currency and face the same problems as the US.The only rational explanation for why the US has not discouraged foreign central banks from acquiring US dollar reserves is political, not economic. The US took on the role of stabilizing the global trade and capital regime after Bretton Woods, because it felt that it had to protect its allies from economic instability and communism, in primis improving the dollar gap, the situation where the stock of US dollars was insufficient to satisfy the demand of goods from Europe nations after World War II, as they needed to finance their imports from the United States without being able to balance their trade. This was one of the goals of the Marshall Plan, which provided dollars and other forms of aid to European countries, and even allowed the same European countries to adopt protectionist policies without implementing retaliation; the program created reliable trading partners and supported the development of stable democratic governments in Western Europe.Exactly the opposite purpose of Beijing’s lending policy and currency policy that, by the way, has systematically increased the reserve role of the US dollar in the last 25 years. If Chinese government had acted differently, it would have either harmed China’s economic growth or it would have caused much more domestic political pressure. This is also true nowadays when the international economic paradigm hasn’t changed.Therefore Chinese renminbi is unlikely to challenge the US dollar as the dominant reserve currency in the near future, first and foremost for a Beijing’s decision to avoid:- Losing control over its monetary policy. This means that China would have to adjust its interest rates and money supply according to the demand and supply of its currency in the global market, rather than according to its domestic economic conditions and goals. - Facing inflationary pressures. This means that China would have to deal with rising prices and wages as a result of having a stronger currency and more foreign inflows. - Having to open up its capital account and financial markets. This means that China would have to allow free movement of capital in and out of its borders and liberalize its financial sector to facilitate the use of its currency by foreign investors and borrowers.Today, almost all the world’s real alliances (the ones that involve security guarantees) link smaller states to Usa, and the main dynamic is the growth of that alliance system. Because the United States still has the most material power and so many allies, unless it renounces its own alliances wholesale, the fate of great-power politics does not depend on any country’s selection of partners. Nations had no control over their level of influence, but they could decide their allies. The current world order resulted not only from power but also from decisions taken by the United States and its allies to collaborate closely in the economic and security domains, first to counter the Soviet Union and then to promote a worldwide order that facilitated trade and cooperation. Their decisions still count. The truth is that the alliances that matter are determined by cultural proximity, integration, mutual respect and willingness to support the enormous and costly effort to maintain them. The United States is the fulcrum of the current order, certainly for its economic and military weight, but above all because it represents a cultural point of reference. Television series, movies, modern literature, music and culture in a broad sense have had a huge impact on my education and all my generation, not for some superiority of America as a Nation but for the melting pot from which that culture derives. Integration is the real key to the future society.From this point of view it finally becomes clear that Europe is indeed in crisis, but the huge effort of integration, much more difficult than the one inherent to American society, gives the European Union the right dimension within the inevitable mixing of skins, talents, thoughts in which today's cities are transforming and in which the outbursts of populism leave no trace.I can testify to this in Italy: a government nostalgic for fascism, whose members until last year made the Roman salute in public squares, which when faced with reality retracts on everything and every out-of-place statement becomes a resounding own goal.After proving this, namely that the world is not multipolar at all, one should examine whether it is truly divided between two equal superpowers. According to “Foreign affairs” from World Bank data: “One way to assess China's economic power, bypassing the government’s manipulation of economic data, is to look at how much of the global profits in each industry are earned by its firms. Based on the analysis of the political economist Sean Starrs, we found that among the world's top 2,000 companies, U.S. firms have the highest share of profits in 74 percent of sectors, while Chinese firms have the highest share in only 11 percent of sectors. The gap is even bigger in high-tech sectors, which are crucial for innovation: U.S. firms have more than half (53 percent) of the profits in these sectors, and no other country with a significant high-tech sector has more than 10 percent. (Japan is second with seven percent, China is third with six percent, and Taiwan is fourth with five percent.) A good indicator of technological capability is how much money one earns from licensing intellectual property - technology that is so valuable that others are willing to pay for it. This data shows that China's large investments in R & D over the last decade are paying off, as its patent royalties have increased from less than $1 billion in 2014 to almost $12 billion in 2021. But China still gets less than a tenth of what the United States does each year ($125 billion), and it also trails far behind Germany ($59 billion) and Japan ($47 billion)”.This does not imply that the world is frozen in 1991, nor that the evolution of power relations between the USA and China has a predetermined course.[...]In particular, the ability to redirect investments into renewable energy (including automotive) at a time when the European private sector could not (or it did not consider it profitable) bear the necessary efforts. Without forgetting a detail that is often completely overlooked when talking about the Chinese advantage in renewables: processing rare earth is a toxic process that creates wastewater and tailing ponds that leak acids, heavy metals and substances such as cadmium, lead and thorium, a low-level radioactive element, most of which are harmful to human health (contrary to what their name may suggest, these elements are not rare in nature but their extraction is hazardous). Then China’s dominance stems from its lax environmental standards, which allowed it to produce rare earths at a far cheaper price than any international rivals. Therefore China accounts for approximately 75% of global manufacturing capacity across seven clean energy technologies.On the other hand even though China has increased its spending on R&D and ICT, it has failed to boost its productivity growth in the past decade. According to Li et al. (2021), R&D and ICT positively affect the productivity of Chinese firms, especially those in high-tech sectors. However, these effects are outweighed by other factors that hinder efficiency and innovation. These factors include limited market entry and exit (Brandt et al., 2020), excessive investment in infrastructure and housing (Cong and Ponticelli, 2017), and distortions in the financial system that favor SOEs and local governments over private enterprises and more productive sectors. China’s TFP [Total factor productivity (TFP) measures how well a business or an economy uses its resources (such as workers and machines) to make products or services. It is the amount of output divided by the average amount of resources. This measure reflects how much output increases without increasing resources. It is often linked to factors like new technology, better ideas, or improved management. TFP is important because it indicates how much a business or an economy can produce and compete with the resources it has. Higher TFP means that more products or services can be made with less resources. This means lower costs and higher profits] growth has been lower than that of other countries at similar income levels since 2012, showing it’s not a productivity-driven economy but still an almost totally investment-driven economy.The West and the East still depend on each other economically, even if they tell different stories about their relations. They have similar needs as before Covid.Europe needs traditional and non-traditional raw materials, and as said above, China needs to sell its products. The US has 2 advantage, one relying on a relatively stronger domestic market than the other two contenders, and the other related to traditional commodities. Anyway Europe has managed to get enough of the latter without relying too much on Russia, a sort of succesfully decoupling .That said Europe still needs China. Von der Leyen recently said: “Most of the European Union countries consider China an irreplaceable economic partner, while understanding the risks that come from the increasingly aggressive international attitude of the Chinese government”.This also means that the European policy towards China is developing differently from the American one. The latter is defined as “decoupling”, i.e. a progressive “separation” of the economies and relations of the two countries, while the former has been defined by von der Leyen herself as “de-risk”, i.e. “elimination of risks” that come from close relations with China, without eliminating the relations themselves.” [...]
Io non dico che le cose stanno necessariamente come ho scritto, ma ritengo sicuramente più sano approcciare la realtà in questo modo piuttosto che tagliarla con l'accetta, che è quello che porta a tutto il male del mondo. Non a caso si parla di banalità del male.
https://themarketjourney.substack.com :
economia, modelli, mercato, finanza
Re: Evoluzione della crisi ucraina
Ma senza andare troppo lontano, ne sa qualcosa il Montenegro...tutto vero? insomma
che l'Europa ne sia serva possiamo anche dire di sì, sai è stata liberata (e poi foraggiata) in gran parte dagli USA... l'URSS s'era tenuta la metà orientale, rendendola più povera di quanto non lo fosse già, con dittature a destra e a manca e svariate stragi razziali. volente o nolente l'altra parte d'Europa è diventata spiccatamente democratica.
se poi crolla l'URSS gli USA non è che hanno tutte ste colpe...
tutt'ora la Russia appoggia governi esteri dove le stragi sono all'ordine del giorno, basta vedere qualsiasi votazione ONU e si capisce bene.
la Cina non ha basi in tutto il mondo perché non l'ha mai voluto, intanto s'è conquistata mezza Africa abbondante: toh, ti faccio una strada e una ferrovia ma tutti i beni che ricavo dal tuo suolo sono miei. ergo, ti impoverisco ancora di più. però lì va bene, perché non lo fanno gli USA, allora è tutto corretto, legittimo.
ancora con sta argomentazione ridicola de: la guerra in Ucraina è colpa degli USA.
lo volete capire che gli stati vicini alla Russia, reduci dall'URSS e consapevoli della dittatura folle di Putin, scelgono SPONTANEAMENTE di fare richiesta per entrare nella NATO o no?
lo volete capire o no che il mondo vuole la democrazia e che se deve "vendersi" a qualcuno lo fa al meno folle? che magari ti offre anche delle garanzie importanti.
Re: Evoluzione della crisi ucraina
Ma che voi sappiate vi sono ancora le limitazioni sull'aria condizionata? Perché a me sembra di si vedendo la gestione in autobus e luoghi pubblici, e francamente se deve durare a oltranza è pesante
Per quanto non ci sia scelto, volevo capire
Inviato dal mio Redmi Note 8 Pro utilizzando Tapatalk
Re: Evoluzione della crisi ucraina
Massì, fa molto: “è colpa di francia e uk nel trattato di versailles se Hitler ha deciso di invadere l’intera Europa e di massacrare milioni di persone”.tutto vero? insomma
che l'Europa ne sia serva possiamo anche dire di sì, sai è stata liberata (e poi foraggiata) in gran parte dagli USA... l'URSS s'era tenuta la metà orientale, rendendola più povera di quanto non lo fosse già, con dittature a destra e a manca e svariate stragi razziali. volente o nolente l'altra parte d'Europa è diventata spiccatamente democratica.
se poi crolla l'URSS gli USA non è che hanno tutte ste colpe...
tutt'ora la Russia appoggia governi esteri dove le stragi sono all'ordine del giorno, basta vedere qualsiasi votazione ONU e si capisce bene.
la Cina non ha basi in tutto il mondo perché non l'ha mai voluto, intanto s'è conquistata mezza Africa abbondante: toh, ti faccio una strada e una ferrovia ma tutti i beni che ricavo dal tuo suolo sono miei. ergo, ti impoverisco ancora di più. però lì va bene, perché non lo fanno gli USA, allora è tutto corretto, legittimo.
ancora con sta argomentazione ridicola de: la guerra in Ucraina è colpa degli USA.
lo volete capire che gli stati vicini alla Russia, reduci dall'URSS e consapevoli della dittatura folle di Putin, scelgono SPONTANEAMENTE di fare richiesta per entrare nella NATO o no?
lo volete capire o no che il mondo vuole la democrazia e che se deve "vendersi" a qualcuno lo fa al meno folle? che magari ti offre anche delle garanzie importanti.
prospetticamente le carte mostrano una potenziale tendenza verso alte potenzialità di prospettiva....
Re: Evoluzione della crisi ucraina
mi sa che hai sbagliato TD
e comunque no, non c'è alcuna limitazione di niente
Si vis pacem, para bellum.
Re: Evoluzione della crisi ucraina
Anche lui si è completamente rincoglionito. Capita.
Neutrofilo, normofilo, fatalistofilo: il politically correct della meteo
27/11: fuori a calci i pregiudicati. Liberazione finalmente.
Re: Evoluzione della crisi ucraina
Russia, <<battaglione colpito dagli ucraini mentre aspettava discorso motivazionale del comandante>>: la denuncia dei blogger nazionalisti
è l'unico non a pagamento che ho trovato, ma è riportato su tutte le testate nazionali e non.
se è anche solo lontanamente vero, è lo specchio della Russia
che idioti, veramente, idioti.
Si vis pacem, para bellum.
Re: Evoluzione della crisi ucraina
No, non ho sbagliato, penso che c'entri e non sia ot fare questa domanda qui. Era solo una domanda, appunto.mi sa che hai sbagliato TD
e comunque no, non c'è alcuna limitazione di niente
Inviato dal mio Redmi Note 8 Pro utilizzando Tapatalk
Re: Evoluzione della crisi ucraina
Notizia di poche ore fa, gli ucraini starebbero avendo successo ad avanzare nell'oblast' di Zaporizhzhia nell'area di P'yatikhatki, anche se si tratta comunque di aree ancora molto vicine alla zona del fronte e di un villaggio molto piccolo.
dalla storia si impara che non si impara dalla storia
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